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1 Introduction 
Transferring authority to lower levels of government, which have better knowledge of 
the local conditions and preferences and are under closer scrutiny by their 
constituencies, is expected to improve the provision of local public goods and services 
(Dethier, 1999; Bardhan, 2002). Tiebout (1956) argues that under fiscal decentralization 
and interjurisdictional competition, citizens can vote with their feet to allocate 
themselves according to their preference to a package of local public goods and taxes. 
In other words, fiscal decentralization can prompt more efficient provisions of local 
public goods if individuals can freely move across localities. In addition to the sorting 
and matching role, Qian and Roland (1998, QR for short hereafter) emphasize that fiscal 
decentralization can also serve as a disciplinary device to preserve market incentives. 
These theories highlight the positive role of fiscal decentralization and 
interjurisdictional competition on the efficiency of public goods provision. In the past 
two decades, decentralization has become a global trend. However, empirical evaluation 
on the impact of decentralization on growth and distribution in developing countries is 
still in its infancy (Bardhan, 2002). 
China, like many developing countries, has undergone a process of fiscal 
decentralization.1 The sheer size of China provides a good ground to test the predictions 
of the theories in the context of development. Using provincial data up to 1993, Lin and 
Liu (2000) provide empirical evidence that decentralization is conductive to growth. 
Zhang and Zou (1998), however, have found a negative relationship between growth 
and decentralization. Jin et al. (2005) reach a more optimistic finding that 
decentralization is not only good for growth but also for equity based on data up to 
1992. Using data at a more microlevel, a few other studies (West and Wong, 1995; Park 
et al., 1996; Knight and Li, 1999) show that decentralization has a negative 
distributional effect. These studies are all based on data up to the early 1990s. Since 
then, more in-depth fiscal reforms have taken place and more comprehensive data have 
become publicly available. Therefore, it is important to extend the work to cover a 
longer period and more spatial units so as to reconcile the differences. 
Compared to the decentralized fiscal system, China’s political system is rather 
centralized and can be described as a multidivisional-form hierarchy structure 
(M-structure) (Maskin et al., 2000). Under this structure, the government can create a 
yardstick competition among local officials by rewarding or publishing them on the 
basis of economic performance. By examining the turnover data of top provincial 
leaders in China, Li and Zhou (2005) show that the internal political market also serves 
as a disciplinary mechanism for local officials to promote economic growth. Their 
finding suggests that the governance structure matters to economic growth in China. 
In this study, we use a nationwide panel data set at the county level to more 
systematically investigate the distributional impact of decentralization by taking into 
account both the fiscal and governance structures. To our knowledge, this study is one 
                                                 
1   For detailed description on China’s fiscal decentralization, see Tong (1998), Zhang (1999), and World 
Bank (2002).   2
of the first attempts made with panel data at the county level.2 The panel data set at the 
county level covering a more recent period provides a vehicle to reconcile the 
differences of empirical research on China’s fiscal decentralization. The work is also a 
contribution to the literature. As Bardhan (2002) points out, few studies have 
empirically examined the performance of fiscal decentralization at the microlevel in 
developing countries. 
The next section provides descriptive statistics of the data set used. Section 3 discusses 
the major theoretical arguments on decentralization. Section 4 presents empirical 
analysis and shows why the results are seemingly in contrary to the theoretical 
predictions. The last section ends with conclusion and policy implications. 
2  Data and descriptive analysis 
Through the 1980s and the early 1990s, China implemented a series of reforms to 
decentralize its fiscal system so as to provide more incentives for local government to 
promote economic growth (Lin and Liu, 2000). However, the decentralization led to 
widening fiscal disparity and shrinking central government revenues (World Bank, 
2002). In 1994, the government introduced the tax sharing reform in order to boost the 
central revenues and enhance intergovernmental transfers. 
In this study, we make use of a county-level public finance data set for our analysis. 
Since 1993, the China Statistical Bureau has published the China County Public 
Finance Statistical Yearbook. The yearbook contains detailed revenue, expenditure, 
gross value of industrial and agricultural output (GVIAO), population, and the size of 
public sector at the county level. There are over 2000 rural counties in China. Between 
1993 and 2000, several hundred counties have changed their names or judiciary 
boundaries. We make an effort to match these counties, relying mainly on the official 
declarations on judiciary changes posted in the Ministry of Civil Affairs website. 
Because data for Tibet are largely missing, we drop Tibet in our analysis. In total, we 
have a panel of 1860 observations in 1993 and 2000. 
Table 1 reports per capita revenues and expenditures as well as their compositions in 
percentage in the coast, inland, and for China as a whole in 2000.3 The per capita 
revenue and expenditure in the coastal region are 50 percent and 43 percent, 
respectively, higher than those in the inland region.4 The difference in the source of 
revenues between the two regions is more noticeable than that in the shares of 
expenditures. Under the new tax sharing system local taxes are closely tied to the 
economic structures. As shown in the upper panel of the table, the more developed 
                                                 
2   Using the same data set Shih and Zhang (2004) examine the issue of transfers and subsidies and Tsui 
(2005) looks at the regional fiscal disparity. 
3   The coastal zone includes Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and 
Guangxi provinces; the inland zone comprises of all the remaining provinces. Kanbur and Zhang 
(1999; 2005) have used the same classification. 
4   The extra-budgetary items are not included in the official statistics. If the tax-sharing reform worsens 
the regressive tax structure, poor regions are more likely to stretch out grabbing hands and the paper’s 
results maybe underestimated. Thanks are due to an anonymous referee for this point.   3
regions can retain more revenues from the value-added tax, the business tax, the urban 
maintenance and construction tax, and the personal income tax which usually accrue to 
the secondary and tertiary sectors. In addition, the coastal region enjoys a higher 
percentage of tax rebates. By looking at the same data source, Tsui (2005) concludes 
that the regional fiscal disparity has worsened since the 1994 fiscal reform. 
 
Table 1. Revenues and expenditures at the county level, 2000 
   Coast  Inland  China 
Revenues (yuan per capita)  488.86 326.14 387.32 
Value-added tax  11.34  5.71  8.38 
Business  tax  9.37 7.04 8.15 
Personal income tax  4.58  2.91  3.70 
Urban maintenance and construction tax  2.53  1.77  2.13 
Agricultural taxes  6.47  10.24  8.45 
Revenue from enterprises  7.37  4.27  5.74 
Tax  rebate  18.22 11.50 14.69 
Subsidies  17.38 36.00 27.16 
Miscellaneous  revenues  22.74 20.56 21.59 
Expenditures (yuan per capita)  467.10 326.58 379.41 
Capital  construction  1.84 2.39 2.14 
Supporting agricultural production  3.59 3.02 3.28 
Operating expenses of agriculture, forestry, water 
conservancy, and meteorology 
3.73 5.16 4.50 
Education  22.70 22.70 22.70 
Social  welfare  1.45 2.43 1.97 
Administrative  expenses  10.71 13.79 12.37 
Public  security  5.42 5.47 5.45 
Original-system  remittances  7.36 2.07 4.52 
Earmarked  remittances  4.08 3.75 3.90 
Miscellaneous  expenditures  39.12 39.22 39.17 
Note:   Calculated by the author based on China County Public Finance Statistics Yearbook. Except for 
per capita revenue and expenditure, all the figures are in percentage. The figures in this table 
may appear to be slightly different from those in Table 1 of Tsui (2005) due to the difference in 
sample coverage. Our study focuses on rural counties while Tsui (2005) does not separate the 
rural counties from urban districts. In addition, we have made more concerted effort to match all 
the counties which have changed names or status from 1993 to 2000.   4
Table 2 presents economic structure and tax rates for the two regions in 1993 and 2000. 
The agricultural tax rate is defined as the ratio of agricultural tax revenue to the gross 
agricultural output value, while the implicit industrial rate is measured as the ratio of tax 
revenues from the industrial sector relative to the gross industrial output value. Land 
rents include city construction tax and land user fees. Fiscal-dependent burden is 
denoted as the number of public employees per 10,000 yuan (1993 value) of local 
revenue. We use the national GDP deflator (1.977) to adjust GVIAO per capita, 
agricultural tax per capita, and land rent per capita to ensure that they are comparable 
between the two years. 
Several features are apparent from Table 2. First, although both regions have 
experienced fast growth, the eastern region has grown at an annual rate of 3.81 percent, 
compared to 3.71 percent in the inland region, indicating a widening regional gap. The 
per capita GVIAO in the coast was about three times of that in the inland region in 
2000. In addition, the share of agricultural output value in total GVIAO in the coastal 
areas was twice of that in the inland region. 
Second, the tax rates in both agricultural and rural industrial sectors are regressive—the 
better-off coastal regions enjoy lower tax rates than the less developed inland regions. 
On a per capita basis, the distribution of agricultural taxes is rather even. However, 
because of the difference in economic base, the effective tax rates differ across regions. 
Figure 1 presents the implicit industrial tax rate against the logarithmic per capita 
GVIAO in 1993 and 2000. The downward straight line in the figure again clearly 
demonstrates that the industrial tax rate is regressive. The richer a county, the lower is 
its industrial tax rate. 
























1993            
 Coast  6062   20.41  0.81  2.74  11.45   
 Inland  2050   41.54  1.15  5.95  11.18   
 China   3569   27.81  0.99  3.67  11.28   
2000            
 Coast  7876   19.20  1.06  0.80  37.91  8.01 
 Inland  2646   37.21  1.72  1.30  39.12  3.89 
 China   4612   25.65  1.40  0.94  38.67  5.44 
Note:   Calculated by author based on China County Public Finance Statistics Yearbook. GVIAO stands 
for the gross value of industrial and agricultural output. Per capita GVIAO, per capita agricultural 
taxes, and per capita land revenue are in constant 1993 yuan. 
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Third, the coastal region benefits more from the rising land value. The local revenue 
from city construction tax and land development in the coastal region is much higher 
than that in the inland region (Zhang, 2006). With a lower industrial tax rate, the rich 
region can attract more investments and migrants, which certainly boost the value of 
land. Figure 2 illustrates that land revenue is positively related to the level of economic 
development, consistent with the results for the two regions in Table 2. The rich regions 
can capitalize more from the rising land value than the poor regions. 
Table 3 reports local government sizes and fiscal burdens to support the government. 
On average there are more than two persons on public payroll per hundred people and 
the ratio has increased between 1993 and 2000, indicating an inflating government size. 
The burden is heavier in the inland than in the coast. Because of the difference in tax 
base, the fiscal burden to support the local government is more unevenly distributed 
across regions. The number of people on public payroll per unit of local revenue in the 
inland region is significantly higher than that in the coastal region. As a result, the 
inland region spent a larger share on the administrative expenses and a smaller amount 
on productive public investment. 
 






















1993       
  Coast  2.08  1.08  9.69  14.39  21.59 
  Inland  2.24  1.75  14.05  13.55  16.57 
  China   2.18  1.43  11.99  13.93  18.47 
2000       
  Coast  2.45  0.99  10.71  5.43  12.82 
  Inland  2.72  1.65  13.79  5.41  8.94 
  China   2.62  1.34  12.37  5.42  10.40 
Note:    The number of government employee per 10,000 yuan of fiscal revenue and per capita 
productive public expenditure in 2000 are adjusted using comparable GDP deflator with 1993 as 
a base year. The definition of the productive public expenditure is not totally comparable 
between 1993 and 2000. In 1993, it includes capital construction (jiben jianshe zhichu), 
expenditures for supporting agricultural production (zhiyuan nongcun shengchan zhichu), and 
expenditures for innovation (waqian gaizao zhichu), while the last term was not listed in the 2000 
yearbook. 
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Note:   The land revenue includes city maintenance and development tax and land using tax. Because 
in 1993 the land using tax was not published, the data in the figure are only for 2000. The vertical 
axis stands for the per capita land revenue in logarithmic form. 
 
Figure 3 further highlights the correlation between fiscal-dependent burden and 
economic development. The negative relationship reveals that the revenue capacity to 
support the public payroll in poor counties is much weaker than in more developed 
ones. The government size, which is to a large extent in proportion to total population, 
is largely determined by the upper level government. The top priorities for the local 
government are collecting taxes, maintaining social order, and carrying over various 
tasks, such as agricultural industrialization and urbanization, assigned from the upper 
level governments (Lin et al., 2002). In the poor regions, the local government has little 
financial resources to carry over the task of public goods provision after covering the 
salaries of public employees. 
To examine the dynamics of regional distribution, we further calculate the Gini 
coefficient of per capita GVIAO, per capita productive public expenditure, and the share 
of productive investment in total public expenditure, respectively, based on data at the 
county level and present them in Table 4. All the three indicators show rising regional 
disparity. The Gini coefficient of per capita GVIAO rises from 46.47 to 48.39. Figure 4 
graphs the density distributions of logarithmic per capita GVIAO in 1993 and 2000, 
which clearly shows a spreading out over the period. Noticeably, inequality in the level 
and share of productive investment has increased by 7 percent and 27 percent, 
respectively, during the 7-year period, much higher than that in per capita GVIAO. 
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Per capita productive public 
expenditure 
Share of productive 
investment in total 
public expenditure 
1993 46.47  68.28  33.04 
2000 48.39  73.34  41.82 
Rate of change (%)  4.13  7.41  26.57 
Note:   Calculated by the author based on China County Public Finance Statistics Yearbook. GVIAO 
stands for the gross value of industrial and agricultural output. 
 
 




















The uneven regional development in nonfarm activities in the rural sector has been 
regarded as one of the major driving forces behind the changes in rural regional 
inequality (Rozelle, 1994; Fan et al., 2004). Wan et al. (2004) and Zhang and Fan 
(2004) further show that the growing regional disparity in public capital significantly 
attributes to the rising regional inequality in nonfarm development largely because 
public capital is complementary to private capital. The evidence here offers an 
additional explanation: regions with higher implicit industrial tax rate have more 
difficulty attracting capital inflows than those with lower tax rates, thereby resulting in 
more fragmentation in capital markets and higher regional disparity.   9
In short, the descriptive analysis shows that along with fiscal decentralization, regional 
distribution in public finance, in particular in productive public expenditure, has greatly 
deteriorated, contrary to what Jin et al. (2005) observed up to 1992. The results seem to 
be inconsistent with the theoretical predictions by Tiebout (1956) and QR (1998). In the 
next section, we provide a more quantitative examination on the impact of 
decentralization. 
3 Theoretical  consideration 
Much of the literature on fiscal federalism, represented by Tibout (1956) and QR 
(1998), focuses on the economic efficiency aspect of market competition. In essence, 
the Tiebout model assumes full factor mobility. Bardhan (2002) comments that the 
assumptions underlying the Tiebout model are often too stringent in developing 
countries. In the case of China, despite loosening control of migration in recent years, 
there still exist obstacles to labor movement, in particular from rural areas to cities. 
Another implicit assumption of the Tiebout model is that local governments are 
responsive to the needs of voters. However, in China local government officials are in 
general not elected and their preferences may not be consistent with those of their 
constituents. In addition, the size of local governments is mainly determined by the 
upper level government and has much less to do with local needs. All these factors may 
make the Tiebout model inapplicable. 
The QR federalism model has a crucial assumption that all the regions are identical. 
Within the more developed coastal areas, such as the Zhejiang province, where many 
counties share similar initial conditions, this assumption may hold. However, for China 
as a whole, regional differences, in particular between the inland and the coast, are 
substantial, making this assumption inappropriate. 
Moreover, these theories do not take the transaction costs of tax collection and its 
consequences into account. As shown in the quote at the top of the first page, Adam 
Smith regarded fairness and economy in tax collection as fundamental principles. 
Regarding collection cost, he stated explicitly (1776: 1044): 
Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of 
the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it 
brings into the public treasury of the state. 
In particular, he opposed levying a tax if it involves a great number of people whose 
salaries eat up a large share of the tax. In a less perfect world, labor migration involves 
costs, so do tax collection and policy implementation. In China’s context, regions differ 
greatly in economic and taxation structures. As a result, the assumptions underlying the 
above two theoretical models may not be valid and the predictions of the above models 
may not bear out in reality. 
Let us begin with a thought experiment. Suppose there are two regions, A (coast) and B 
(inland). Before the fiscal decentralization, region A is endowed with a large share of 
nonfarm economy while region B relies on agriculture as the major source of revenue.   10
However, the administrative structures in the two regions are the same.5 In addition, the 
average cost of collecting each unit of tax from a firm is much lower than that from a 
rural household. Consequently, both regions prefer to levy taxes on enterprises than on 
households if possible. After decentralization, both regions must be responsible for 
collecting their own revenues and fulfilling the same responsibilities or mandates.6 
In region A, because of the large industrial base, the local government can obtain most 
revenues from the industrial sector. Moreover, a large industrial base means high 
opportunity cost of labor, making collecting taxes from rural households rather costly. If 
the incurred tax collection cost from households outweighs the revenue, it is more cost 
effective for the local government to forego farmers’ tax obligations and pay the 
agricultural taxes to upper level governments using other revenue sources. When there 
are many local enterprises, the implicit taxation burden to each firm is relatively lower, 
which in turn help attract more business and enlarge the tax base. In addition, the 
current tax sharing scheme favors regions with larger share of the secondary and tertiary 
sectors as the value-added taxes and personal income taxes which are shared with the 
local government are largely linked to these sectors (Tsui, 2005). 
Moreover, because the local government size is mainly related to the size of the 
population instead of the level of economic development, the government in region A 
has more local revenues disposable for productive public investment after covering the 
salaries of public employees. Better infrastructure and lower tax burdens can offset the 
relatively higher labor and land cost in region A. All these help create an enabling 
investment and form a virtuous cycle. In other words, in region A, the local government 
tends to stretch out helping hands to business development (Frye and Shleifer, 1997). 
This is a hypothesis we want to test. 
In contrast, in region B, there are few nonfarm enterprises. Because of lower tax 
collection cost on firms relative to agricultural taxes on households, the existing firms 
are more prone to be the predatory targets of their local government’s excessive taxes 
and fees. Therefore, the implicit industrial tax rate tends to be high, which will 
discourage the entry of potential investment and drive away existing business 
enterprises, hampering the growth in the nonfarm sector over the long run. However, in 
China the size of local governments is rather fixed. After paying the salaries of public 
employees, local governments in poor regions often have little resources remaining to 
provide public investment. Low levels and quality of public infrastructure and service 
often result in unfavorable investment environment. Obviously, it is hard for any factory 
to operate normally and efficiently in an area plagued with irregular power outage and 
unpaved roads. Consequently, region B may have worse investment environment 
despite its lower wage rate and land rent. The large share of the agriculture sector means 
a higher collection cost of taxes on average because a higher level of manpower is 
required in the collection activities. Consequently we hypothesize that in region B, the 
local governments tend to have grabbing hands. 
                                                 
5   Xu Yong (2003) has documented the evolution of administrative units in rural China and shown how 
excessive they are. 
6   Liu and Tao (2004) list a set of central mandates and policy burdens.   11
All in all, under fiscal decentralization, the transaction cost of tax collection and 
economic structure may affect the outcome of decentralization. As a result, the 
relationship between the local government and businesses may differ across regions. 
Because of the difference in initial economic structure and endowment, two 
equilibrium, one with helping hands and one with grabbing hands, may evolve as 
theorized by Cai and Treisman (2005). It is an empirical question to examine whether 
under fiscal decentralization the heterogenous revenue structure and homogenous 
government structure matter to the growth patterns. 
4 Quantitative  analysis 
Now we use a more quantitative method to examine the impact of initial economic 
structure and fiscal-dependent burdens on subsequent local economic growth. Following 
Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) on growth convergence, we model the growth rate of 
per capita GVIAO as a function of its initial value, initial economic structure, fiscal-
dependent burdens, and a set of other variables: 
1
1









=+ + + + δ    (1) 
where yit is the per capita GVIAO. The subscripts t and t–1 refer to 2000 and 1993, 
respectively. The left-hand side variable represents the growth rate of per capita GVIAO 
over the period. The coefficient β stands for the speed of convergence of per capita 
GVIAO. A negative value for this coefficient indicates convergence while a positive 
value implies divergence. It provides useful information on understanding how initial 
conditions contribute to long-term growth and whether there is convergence or not. 
Because of diminishing returns to capital, in a perfect market, the returns to capital and 
labor will equalize across regions and lead to convergence. Z includes the share of the 
gross value of agricultural output in GVIAO, the ratio of public employee to the total 
local revenue. These two variables are in logarithmic form. γ is the corresponding 
coefficient for the two variables. D is a set of dummy variables. If a county is nationally 
designated poor county, it is assigned a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. In different 
specifications, we also include prefecture and provincial fixed effects. δ is a vector of 
coefficients for these fixed effects. 
Table 5 reports regression results under four specifications. The first three regressions 
include prefecture, provincial, and regional fixed effects, respectively. The last column 
excludes any dummy variables. The second to the last row presents the Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC) for model selection. The model with the smallest value is 
preferred. The AIC criterion suggests that the first regression with the prefecture fixed 
effects dominates the other three. Because we do not have county-specific price 
information, the fixed prefecture effects serve as a good proxy to eliminate the price 
effect inherent in the nominal growth of per capital GVIAO in the period. Moreover, 
they may capture other shocks common to a prefecture. 
   12
Table 5. The effect of initial economic structure and government size on economic growth 
Variables  R1  R2  R3  R4 












Economic structure in 1993 













Fiscal-dependent burdens in 1993 





























Omission variable test (p-value) 0.336  0.037  0.086  0.046 
AIC 1681.5  2220.1  2598.8  2653.1 
Adjusted R
2  0.536 0.290  0.117  0.090 
Note:   Coefficients for dummies are not reported here. The figures in the parentheses are standard 
errors. The symbol 
** means a significance level of 1 percent. 
 
Table 5 also presents the p-values of the regression specification error test (RESET) for 
omitted variables. Only the first specification with prefecture dummies accepts the null 
hypothesis that there are no missing variables. The other three regressions all reject the 
null hypotheses. As a result, the first specification is preferable. 
The coefficient for the initial value of per capita GVIAO in all the three regressions is 
negative, suggesting the existence of a mean convergence. The coefficient for the share 
of agricultural output in the initial year of 1993 is statistically significant in all the three 
regressions, indicating that the heterogenous economic structure is an offsetting 
divergent force. For a region primarily relying on agricultural revenues, the subsequent 
growth in productive expenditure is slower than a region endowed with a large nonfarm 
tax base. 
The negative and significant coefficient for the fiscal-dependent variable in 1993 
suggests that oversized bureaucracy can be a real burden for local economic growth in 
poor regions. In an ideal Tibout world where local governments are responsive to the 
needs of constituents, lower revenues mean lower levels of public service and smaller 
government. Because of the nature of political centralization in China, the government 
size is rather inflexible, which leads to relatively heavier burdens in the poorer regions 
than in the richer regions under the arrangement of fiscal decentralization. 
Table 5 also shows that those nationally designated poor counties are growing slower 
than other counties. This is consistent with the findings by Fan et al. (2004) on the   13
performance of China’s poverty alleviation program. There are several possible 
explanations. First, local governments in the poor countries may be more likely to 
understate their performance indicators so as to retain the designated-poverty status and 
qualify for transfers. Second, in the presence of central transfers, local officials may 
spend more time building up connections with the upper level governments rather than 
developing the local economy. 
The coefficients for the dummy variables are not presented in the table to save space. 
They are jointly significant in the first three specifications. In the third specification, the 
coefficient for the inland coefficient is statistically negative. To check the robustness of 
the results, Table 6 lists the separate regression results for the coastal and inland 
regions. Except for the economic structure variable, the coefficients for other variables 
are rather robust. Within a prefecture in a coastal region, the economic structure is more 
homogenous. This is probably why the coefficient for this variable in the first regression 
is insignificant. 
In short, fiscal decentralization may bring about detrimental distributional consequences 
when economic structure differs and government sizes are excessive. 
 
Table 6. The effect of initial economic structure and government size  
on economic growth by region 
Variables Coast  Inland 






Economic structure in 1993 






Fiscal-dependent burdens in 1993 














2  0.690 0.580 
Note:   Coefficients for prefecture dummies are not reported here. The figures in the 
parentheses are standard errors. The symbol 
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5  Conclusions and policy implication 
Considering the sheer size of China, fiscal decentralization is imperative for the 
government to tackle the information and incentive problems inherent in the 
relationship between the central and local governments. However, decentralization is a 
complex process involving not only fiscal aspects but also governance and mandates. 
When government sizes are largely independent of the demand of constituencies, the 
standard Tibout sorting model is no longer applicable. 
Under the current local–central fiscal arrangement, the large regional variation in 
production patterns and revenue structures makes the underlying assumption of the QR 
fiscal federalism model invalid. Moreover, the transaction costs of tax collections 
become a more serious issue under fiscal decentralization. The high collection cost of 
agricultural tax plus the excessive government size makes local governments in regions 
endowed mostly with agricultural production barely able to provide the necessary public 
goods and services. Farmers and firms in poor regions are paying heavy taxes, while 
those in rich regions enjoy generous support and lower tax burdens. The regressive 
nature of the rural taxation system plays a significant role in explaining the divergent 
regional growth patterns even after controlling for the initial value. Overall, the fiscal 
decentralization is in favor of the rich localities and exacerbates the regional gap. 
In his famous article, Oates (1968) has argued that to ensure the functioning of fiscal 
federalism, the central government should carry over the functions of stabilization and 
distribution, while the local government should be mainly responsible for performing 
the allocation role, i.e., a more efficient provision of public goods and service. In the 
case of China, however, the local government has to perform both the functions of 
distribution and allocation. By nature, it is almost impossible for local governments to 
equalize the fiscal capacity across regions in such a diverse country. 
The large and inflexible size of local governments is another major impediment. 
Without a large reduction in the number of local public employees, especially in areas 
with agriculture as the major means of revenue, fiscal decentralization alone is not 
sufficient to deal with the distributional problem. Most theories on federalism assume 
that size and service of the local government are responsive to the needs of local 
residents. In a democratic society, voters endogenously determine the local government 
size. However, under the current system in China, if the central government grants more 
power to the local government and lets it determine the staffing level, it is likely that 
local government sizes in the less developed region will inflate rather than decrease. In 
a region lacking nonfarm job opportunities, entering the government payroll is one of 
the most attractive options, which may create a large rent-seeking behavior for officials 
to hire relatives and friends. Consequently, the size of local government is more likely 
to increase provided that the constituents do not have much say on local affairs. 
Therefore, how to control and reduce government sizes under the current political 
system poses a dilemma for policy markers. Economic decentralization in the reform 
period has undoubtedly helped prompt China’s growth. But under the regime of 
political centralization, regional disparities have widened significantly. How to achieve 
balanced regional growth is a delicate task. Considering that China has been rather 
successful in engineering institutional innovations based on existing institutions, the 
challenge may induce more institutional innovations on fiscal decentralization and 
governance.   15
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